Interactive simulator

What-if control simulator

Pick a threat, toggle the security controls of your architecture, and watch likelihood, residual risk, detection coverage, evidence and governance exposure recalculate live.

2/2 applicable controls enabled · critical inherent severity
Applicable to this threat
Other controls in library · 13
Likelihood
significant
85/100
Residual risk
critical
critical
Detection coverage
100%

Governance impact score

ISO 27001
ISO/IEC 27001 — Information Security
50%

0.5 of 1 references currently exposed or partially covered.

NIST CSF
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
50%

0.5 of 1 references currently exposed or partially covered.

ISO 42001
ISO/IEC 42001 — AI Management System
0%

No direct references from this threat — baseline posture only.

AI Act
EU Artificial Intelligence Act
0%

No direct references from this threat — baseline posture only.

NIS2
EU NIS2 Directive
50%

0.5 of 1 references currently exposed or partially covered.

Exposure rises as preventive controls are disabled and as detective controls stop producing evidence — the same signals every governance framework asks you to demonstrate.

Live analysis

With the current control posture, APT28 (Fancy Bear) sits at a likelihood score of 85/100 (significant). No preventive layer applies — invest in one before accepting the risk. Detection coverage of 100% gives a realistic chance of catching this in flight.

  • Likelihood: No preventive controls apply — likelihood is close to inherent for this threat.
  • Residual: Residual survives via coverage drift; monitor and rehearse response.
  • Detection: Every detective control mapped to this threat is enabled.
Contextual observations · reacts to every toggle
  • MFA enabled → password spraying and credential replay become significantly harder.
  • PowerShell logging on → post-exploitation activity is reconstructible from script-block events.
  • EDR enabled → malicious execution is more likely to be detected and contained.
  • Immutable backups in place → ransomware becomes a recovery event, not a business-ending one.
  • Segmentation limits blast radius — a single foothold does not reach crown-jewel systems.
  • PAM brokers privileged access → admin tokens are not recoverable from user endpoints.
  • Central logging active → cross-system correlation and tamper-resistant forensics remain intact.
  • Email authentication and filtering block spoofed and payload-bearing mail before delivery.
  • Awareness training reduces click-through and shortens time-to-report of phishing.
  • Application allow-listing prevents unsigned tooling from executing at all.
  • DLP watches for staged bulk exfiltration and blocks large data movements.
  • Patch management closes KEV-listed CVEs before they become the initial-access path.
  • Prompt hardening reduces the success rate of prompt-injection and jailbreaks on production LLMs.
  • AI runtime monitoring flags drift, abuse and adversarial inputs against deployed models.
  • Model governance proves which weights and training data are in production — required to evidence AI Act obligations.

Business impact

Materialisation of the underlying threat scenario

Techniques covered · 2

Evidence availability

● Available · 4● Missing · 0
edr·Tamper-protection configuration
Produced by Behavioural EDR
edr·Recent behavioural alert with response actions
Produced by Behavioural EDR
siem·Log ingestion coverage report
Produced by Centralised log collection & monitoring
config·Write-once log-forwarding architecture
Produced by Centralised log collection & monitoring

Governance impact

NIST CSF·ID.RA — Risk Assessment (threat intelligence)
partially-covered

NIST CSF fires here because the behaviour of "APT28 (Fancy Bear)" is the exact scenario ID.RA — Risk Assessment (threat intelligence) exists to prevent — Threat-actor profiles feed the intelligence inputs required by CSF risk assessment.

ISO 27001·A.5.7 Threat intelligence
partially-covered

ISO 27001 fires here because the behaviour of "APT28 (Fancy Bear)" is the exact scenario A.5.7 Threat intelligence exists to prevent — The 2022 revision of ISO 27001 explicitly requires collection and use of threat intelligence.

NIS2·Art. 21(2)(a) — Risk analysis policies
partially-covered

NIS2 fires here because the behaviour of "APT28 (Fancy Bear)" is the exact scenario Art. 21(2)(a) — Risk analysis policies exists to prevent — Actor-centric risk analysis is expected as part of NIS2 risk-management measures.

Missing controls · 0

Every applicable control is currently enabled — the posture is complete for this threat.

Suggested next actions

  1. 1Escalate to risk owner — the posture does not meet an acceptable residual.
  2. 2Snapshot this simulation and attach it to the investigation workspace.

AI reasoning

Ask the AI to translate the simulation into an analyst-ready explanation of why residual risk lands at critical and what to fix first.

Explore in the graph

Every technique above is a real graph node — open the Explorer to inspect neighbours, related campaigns and D3FEND countermeasures.

Orchicyb Copilot
Threat intel · detection engineering

Ask about any technique, actor, malware or campaign — or generate detections, attack chains and reports. I ground answers in your live knowledge graph.